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8.1  Introduction 
In economic terms, Japan is a large country with a large internal market in 
addition to its export potential. In an area that is one twenty-fifth the size of 
the United States, Japan has slightly over half of the population of the United 
States, and more than one-third of  its GNP. Japan's  manufacturing sector is 
relatively larger, with total employment in manufacturing around 42% of  that 
in the United States. One of the major differences  between the two countries has 
been the much faster rate of productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing. 
Although the oil crises of  1973 and 1979 affected both economies severely 
and output and productivity growth slowed in both of them, the productivity 
of labor in manufacturing continued to increase much faster in Japan than in 
the United States during the 1970s.' These events elicited many comments and 
studies but mostly at the aggregate macrolevel. Also, while there has been 
much discussion of  the possible role of  differential R&D policies in  these 
events, there has been little quantitative examination of the R&D-productivity 
growth relationship; what there has been has focused largely on aggregate data 
and single-country analysk2  It is our intention to look at these issues using 
This chapter is coauthored with Jacques Mairesse and is reprinted from Productiviry Growth in 
Japan and  the  United States, edited by Charles R. Hulten, pp. 317-40  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990). 0 1990 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved. 
The authors are indebted to T. Tachibanaki for providing the Japanese data and assisting with 
their interpretation, to A. Neff for help with Japanese price indexes, to T. Abbott and M. Sassenou 
for very  able research assistance, and to the National Science Foundation (PRA81-08635 and 
SES82-08006). le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, and the National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research Program on Productivity and Technical Change Studies for financial support. 
1. See, e.g., the Economic Report ofthe President (Council of Economic Advisers 1984, table 
3.3). 
2. One exception at the macrolevel is Mohnen, Nadiri, and hucha (1986). After this paper was 
written we became aware also of the work of Odagiri (1983) and Odagiri and Iwata (1986), who 
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Japanese and U.S. company data in an  attempt to assess the contribution of 
R&D to productivity in both countries. 
This paper can be viewed as a continuation of our previous work on R&D 
and productivity growth at the firm level in the United States and in France. In 
analyzing the data for French and U.S. manufacturing we  found that differ- 
ences in R&D effort do not account for much of the observed difference in the 
average rate of productivity growth or its distribution across industrial sectors 
or firms (see Griliches and Mairesse 1983, 1984; Cuneo and Mairesse 1984). 
The availability of similar data for Japan led us to extend these comparisons to 
that country and the United States, between which the contrasts are even larger. 
Our work differs from much of the productivity-comparisons literature by 
taking the individual firm data as its primary focus. Firm data have the virtue 
of providing us with much more variance in the relevant variables and a more 
appropriate level of analysis, the level at which most of our theories are speci- 
fied. By working with microlevel data we  escape many  of  the aggregation 
problems that plague macroeconomics. On the other hand, these benefits do 
not come without cost. Our data bases rarely contain enough variables relevant 
to the specific circumstances of  a particular firm, and the available variables 
themselves are subject to much higher relative error rates, which are largely 
averaged out in aggregate data. 
The basic approach we follow in this paper is to compute simple productiv- 
ity-growth measures for individual manufacturing firms both in Japan and the 
United States for the relatively recent 1973-80 period and relate them to differ- 
ences in the intensity of R&D effort. We  start by  describing our data sources 
and the overall pattern of R&D spending in manufacturing in both countries 
and by reviewing the major trends in productivity growth across different in- 
dustrial sectors. We  then turn to the discussion of  regression results that at- 
tempt to account for the differences in labor productivity growth by the differ- 
ences in the growth of the capital-labor ratio and in the intensity of R&D effort 
across different firms for total manufacturing as a whole and also separately 
within specific industrial sectors. 
Since, as we shall point out in some detail later on, the Japanese R&D data 
at the firm level turn out to be especially incomplete, we cannot provide a 
solution to the original puzzle of  differential growth rates, but we  still have 
some interesting facts and several new puzzles to report. 
8.2  Comparing R&D Expenditures 
Before we look at our R&D data at the firm level, it is useful to compare the 
industrial distribution of  R&D expenditures in both countries. Tables 8.1 and 
use the same Japanese data base to construct value-added-based TFP growth measures and relate 
them to firm  R&D intensities. Their results for Japan are similar to ours but they make no cross- 
country comparisons. Table 8.1  R&D Firms in Manufacturing, Japan, 1976: The Relative Importance of Large Firms (1,OOO  or more employees) and Their 
Industrial Distribution 
Company R&D 
No. of Employees  Sales in Units  Expenditures in 
in Millions and  of  100 Billion  Units of  100 Billion  No. of  R&D 













15.14  85,650  ,012 
100  11,950  ,018 
78  1,120  .O 1  8 
78  1,030  ,019 
Large R&D-doing firms: 
Total 
Distribution by industry:b 
1.  Food & kindred 
2.  Chemicals & rubber 
3.  Drugs 
4.  Primary & fabricated metals 
5.  Machinery 
6.  Electrical equipment 
7.  Transportation equipment 
8.  Instruments 



















































Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development (Prime Minister’s Office 1976). 
Note: “Manufacturing” excludes petroleum refining. 
”Total R&D/total sales (not average of firm ratios). 
The  numbers in the first three columns are percentages and add up to 100. 190  Chapter8 
8.2 show comparative statistics on the magnitude and industrial distribution of 
R&D expenditures for manufacturing in both countries, focusing on the role 
of “large” firms (firms with more than 1,000  employee^).^ We look primarily 
at large firms because they account for most of the R&D in either country and 
also because these are the firms represented in our microdata sets. 
Comparing the two tables we can see that large firms are more numerous 
in the United States, and that, on average, they are also larger (about 10,000 
employees per firm versus 3,500 in Japan). Large firms account for 70% of 
total sales and 65% of total employment in manufacturing in the United States 
versus 52% and 41%, respectively, in Japan. Similarly, large firms do almost 
all of the R&D in the United  States--94%-but  only about three-quarters 
in Japan.4 
Allowing for differences in the size of the countries and the size distribution 
of  firms, there is very little difference either in the intensity or the sectoral 
distribution  of  company-financed  R&D expenditures in  the two  countries. 
There is a big difference, however, in the involvement of government in the 
financing of  R&D performed in manufacturing. In the United States, over a 
third of  total R&D has been federally financed while in Japan the state ac- 
counts for less than 2% of the total.5 Since our microdata reflect only company 
financed R&D we shall not be able to discuss the role of public R&D support 
in this context.6 
While, in absolute terms, large Japanese manufacturing companies spend 
only about a third as much on R&D as U.S. companies do, the relation of these 
expenditures to sales is remarkably similar (about 2%) in both countries. The 
distribution of total company R&D by industry and of the intensity of  R&D 
effort are also very similar in the two countries. Most of  the R&D is done 
in three sectors: electrical equipment, transportation equipment, and chemical 
industries.’ The highest R&D to sales ratios are to be found in the drug and 
electrical equipment industries, the only noticeable difference being the some- 
what higher relative R&D expenditure in the U.S. instruments industry. 
We turn now to the consideration of  our firm-level data sources. In both 
3. These numbers come from the national R&D surveys conducted by the Statistics Bureau in 
the Prime Minister’s Office (various years) in Japan and the National Science Foundation (various 
years) in the United States. 
4. Some of this contrast may be an artifact of different reporting conventions in the two coun- 
tries. A perusal of the individual-firm data seems to indicate that there is less consolidation in 
Japan, with more units, which in the United States would be treated as subsidiaries, appearing as 
independent firms in the Japanese sources. 
5. See Peck (1985) for more discussion of this difference. 
6.  See Griliches (1980, 1986) for more discussion on this topic. 
7. Because we try to have reasonably sized samples in the various “industries,” we have aggre- 
gated some of the more detailed statistics into nine industrial “sectors.” Thus, sector 2 includes 
chemical and rubber firms, but not pharmaceutical firms, sector 6 includes computers, electrical 
machinery, and electrical and communication equipment, while sector 9 brings together the textile, 
paper, wood, glass, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries. Petroleum refining is excluded Table 8.2  R&D Firms in Manufacturing, United States, 1976 The Relative Importance of  Large Firms (1,OOO  or more employees) and Their 
Industrial Distribution 
Company R&D  R&D Sales Ratioa 
No. of  Sales in  Expenditures 
Employees  Billions of  in Billions of 
in Millions  Dollars and  Dollars and  No. of  Company 
and Percentages  Percentages  Percentages  Firms  Total  Financed 
1977 All Firms 
R&D firms 
Large firms 
Large R&D firms 
21.5  1,275  18.00  295,000  ,022  ,014 
62  63  100  2,835  .035  ,022 
65  70  94  1,910  ,030  ,019 
56  61  94  1,140  ,035  ,022 
1976 Large R&D firms: 
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Source: Information for all firms in manufacturing from Enterprise Srarisrics: General Report on  Industrial Organization (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1977). R&D 
related numbers from NSF, Research and Developmenr in Indusrry, 1976 and 1977 issues. 
Nore: “Manufacturing”  excludes petroleum refining. 
Total R&D/total sales (not average of firm ratios). 
The  numbers in the first three columns are percentages and add up to 100. 192  Chapter8 
countries the responses to official R&D surveys are confidential and not pub- 
licly available. However, information on individual firms’ R&D expenditures 
is available in their public annual reports or their filings with the respective 
securities markets regulatory authorities (10K statements in the United States). 
In Japan such data are collected and organized by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
Corporation and are known as the NEEDS data base. In the United States, the 
equivalent is Standard and Poor’s Annual Industrial Compustat. 
We  have  worked previously with the Compustat data and have created a 
consistent panel data set based on it.8 This is, however, our first experience 
with the NEEDS data, and we had to invest heavily in cleaning them and in 
trying to understand their construction and provenance. Except for the R&D 
numbers, as we shall see below, these data seem of comparable quality to the 
Compustat data for the United States. 
The general characteristics of  the parallel firm samples that we have con- 
structed are depicted in table 8.3. If  we insist on continuous data from 1972 
through 1980 with no major mergers or major jumps in the series and require 
also consistent reporting of R&D expenditures throughout this period, we have 
complete data for about 400 R&D firms in Japan and slightly over 500 R&D 
firms in the United  state^.^ The U.S. firms are significantly larger, by a factor 
of  four on average. They also seem to be doing much more R&D, even rela- 
tively. Here we  stumble on our major difficulty with the NEEDS data. The 
R&D data appear to be badly underreported in this source. If  we compare the 
numbers in table 8.1 with those in table 8.2, we observe that the overall com- 
pany financed R&D to sales ratio is roughly similar in both countries and only 
slightly lower in Japan (1.91% vs. 2.3%  in the United States for large R&D- 
performing firms), while the numbers in table 8.3 imply that the U.S. firms are 
twice as R&D intensive. 
It does not take very long to convince oneself that indeed the NEEDS data 
are heavily deficient in their R&D coverage. Table 8.4 reports coverage ratios 
for 1981 of the NEEDS R&D numbers relative to the official Japanese R&D 
survey. While the large firms in the NEEDS sample account for close to 80% 
of the relevant employment and sales totals, the coverage of R&D expenditures 
is only slightly above one-third.’O Looking at the distribution by industrial sec- 
8. See Bound, Cummins, Griliches, Hall, and Jaffe (1984) and Hall, Cumins,  Laderman, and 
Mundy (1988) for a discussion of the construction and description of this data set, which includes 
also a match to the Patent Office data on the number of patents granted to these firms. 
9. If we do not require consistent reporting of R&D expenditures we have samples of  about 
1,OOO  manufacturing firms in each country. Because of the significant and intermittent nonre- 
porting of R&D one cannot assume that the other firms (the ones not included) are truly “zero- 
R&D’ firms. Thus one cannot separate our samples cleanly into R&D and non-R&D firms and 
compare the results. This has only been possible in a study for France, because it was conducted 
within the National Institute of Statistics and we had access to the individual data of the French 
R&D survey (see Mairesse and Cuneo 1985). 
10. The coverage ratios in table 8.4 are for the most recent year that we had data for in both the 
NEEDS and R&D surveys (1981) but they are not much different in the earlier years. There has 
been little improvement in R&D reporting in the NEEDS data base. The coverage ratios for the 193  Comparing Japanese and U.S. Manufacturing Firms 
Table 8.3  Japan and the United States: 1976 Characteristics  of the 1972-80 
Continuous Samples 
Japan"  United States 
R&D Reporting 
Variable  Total  Originalb  Correcte&  Total  R&D Reportingd 
N  1,032  394  406  968  525 
Average employment, 
in thousands  2.7  3.4  4.5  13  17 
Average sales, in 
millions of dollars  215  242  345  655  872 
Average plant, in 
millions of dollars  118  128  187  330  434 
Average R&D, in 
millions of dollars  -  3.1  6.9  -  22.7 
Average R&D/sales 
ratio'  -  ,012  ,013  -  .024 
"From the NEEDS (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) data base. Converted to dollars at $1 = Y300. 
addition to the 394 continuously R&D-reporting firms in the Japanese sample, there are also 
338 firms that reported nonzero R&D expenditures in one or more years in the 1972-80  period. 
'The  data on largest R&D-performing firms in Japan reported in OECD (1984) were used to fill 
in some missing values and adjust others for apparent underreporting. 
addition to the 525 continuously R&D-reporting firms in the U.S. sample, with no major jumps, 
there are also 129 firms that reported nonzero R&D expenditures in  one or more years in the 
1972-80  period. 
'Average of individual firm R&D to sales ratios. 
tor we see that coverage varies from good to reasonable for the chemical, drug, 
and instruments industries, but that it is abysmal for motor vehicles and trans- 
portation equipment and poor for the rest of manufacturing. The magnitude of 
the problem can be appreciated when it is realized that neither Toyota, Hitachi, 
Nissan, nor Honda report positive R&D expenditures in the NEEDS data base. 
Using information published by  the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development (OECD 1984) on the 20 largest R&D performers in 
Japan in 1979, we find that of the 18 firms that should be within our definition 
of manufacturing and are indeed in the NEEDS file, 10 report no R&D whatso- 
ever, 3 report about the same amount of R&D in both sources, and, what may 
be even more worrisome, 5 companies report significantly less R&D in the 
NEEDS data base than is reported by the OECD. For example, the reported 
R&D expenditures of  the Sony Corporation differ by  a factor of  two. If  the 
OECD information is added to the NEEDS data set, total R&D expenditures 
come close to doubling, and the coverage ratio rises to a respectable 73%. 
Thus the problem we face is not only that R&D is missing for some firms, 
large firms were 30% and 35% in 1976 and 1981, respectively. Fms  that do report their R&D in 
the NEEDS data base do so continuously and apparently on a consistent basis. 194  Chapter8 
Table 8.4  Comparison of NEEDS 1981 Data to the Japanese Official 1981 R&D 
Survey Coverage in Ratios Expressed in Percentages 
Firms  Employees  Sales  R&D Expenditures 
All  1.2  30  46  29 
R&D-reporting  4.2  35  38  29 
Large firms (1,000 or more 
employees)  58  79  78  35 
Large R&D-reporting firms, 
By sector: 
total  45 
1.  Food & kindred  27 
2.  Chemicals & rubber  65 
3.  Drugs  71 
4.  Metals  60 
5.  Machinery  46 
6.  Electrical equipment  51 
7.  Transportation equipment  38 
8.  Instruments  42 































a problem that we could either ignore or adjust for in some way, but also that 
the reported figures themselves appear to be inaccurate. They reflect not only 
real differences in  this variable but also differences in reporting practices. 
Since there was nothing else that we could do at this point, we complemented 
or adjusted the R&D figures for the 18 very large R&D firms for which we 
had OECD information and proceeded to analyze these data as if they actually 
mean what they say. The best we can hope for is that the reported R&D num- 
bers are still acceptable proxies for the true figures.I’ We will come back, how- 
ever, to this issue in interpreting the results of our analyses. 
A few words should be said at this point about the U.S. R&D data. They 
indeed seem better. Even though they are not exactly conceptually equivalent, 
the l0K-based reports and the NSF-collected (National Science Foundation, 
various issues) numbers are not very far apart, especially as far as industry 
totals are concerned. A recent analysis by the NSF (1985) of data for the 200 
largest R&D performers finds the totals in 1981 remarkably close (within 3%), 
though this covers up significant individual variability. Forty-seven percent of 
the firms reported totals within 10% in both sources; 22% were within 10% to 
25%  and only 13% were off by  more than 25%. Eighteen percent were not 
included in the Compustat-based data base, primarily because they were either 
11. Even if the total R&D levels are about right (after correction) and comparable in the two 
countries, if the individual observations are subject to much error and different reporting practices 
(especially for the smaller R&D performers), our subsequent regression-based estimates of the 
“importance” of  R&D may be significantly biased downward. Actually, however, adjusting the 
R&D data for the 18 large R&D-performing firms, using the OECD (1984) information, had very 
little effect on our regression estimates. 195  Comparing Japanese and U.S. Manufacturing Firms 
privately or foreign owned. Using  1976 totals and adjusting for differences 
in definition and coverage, we ourselves estimated that the Compustat-based 
universe contained about 85% of total R&D reported to the NSF, with the ma- 
jor discrepancy arising from the above mentioned absence of  privately and 
foreign owned firms in these data.I2  At the same time, our selection of “contin- 
uous R&D’  firms preserves about 80% of the total R&D reported in the 1976 
large Compustat cross section. Thus, roughly speaking, the firms contained in 
our U.S. sample account for about 70% of the total company financed R&D as 
reported to the National Science Foundation. 
8.3  Comparing Trends in Productivity Growth 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the R&D data, we look now at the produc- 
tivity record of the firms in our samples for both countries during the 1970s. 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 list the sample sizes, averages, and standard deviations for 
some of  our major variables by  industrial sector and for manufacturing as a 
whole. The construction of the major variables is similar for both countries 
except that in the United States we were able to use 3-digit SIC-level price 
deflators and business segment information to construct individual firm sales 
deflators, while for Japan we  had to use general 2-digit level  deflator^.'^ In 
both countries the gross plant figures were converted from historical to con- 
stant prices using the information contained in the net versus gross plant dis- 
tin~tion.’~  In neither data set do we have information on hours worked, and 
materials purchases are available only for Japan. 
There are a number of interesting observations to be made on the basis of 
tables 8.5 and 8.6, some less obvious than others. The major contrast between 
the two countries is in the employment story and the associated productivity 
movements. In Japan, total employment declined in eight out of the nine indus- 
trial groupings, whereas, in the United States, it rose in all sectors. In fact, real 
output per firm as measured by  deflated sales grew at about the same rate in 
the United States as in Japan, 3.5% per year on average, with the big difference 
in the productivity numbers coming essentially from the behavior of  the em- 
ployment series. 
The same thing is also true for the growth in the capital-labor ratio, which 
grew twice as fast in Japan as in the United States, while the capital stock was 
growing at roughly  similar rates in both countries during this same period 
(about 6.4% per year). It is also interesting to note that in both countries the 
12. See Bound et al. (1984) for more detail. 
13. The 2-digit deflators for Japan are taken from the Prices Indices Annual issues (Bank of 
Japan, various years). In previous work, we were able to verify that using 2-digit deflators, instead 
of more detailed ones, in the case of  the United States had very little effect on the regression esti- 
mates. 
14. See the appendix of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) for more detail on the adjustment of the 
gross plant numbers for inflation. Using alternative measures for physical capital had little effect 
on our results. Table 8.5  Continuous R&D-Reporting  Firms Subsample for Japan, 1973-80 Growth Rates (per year) and 1973 Levels: Means (and standard 
deviations) for Major Variables 
Industry 
Average Growth Rates 1973-80 
Employed,  Deflated  Adjusted Gross 
Average 
1976  in  RIS  1973  Sales per  Plant per  Approximate 
N  Thousandsa  (estimated)b  Employees  Employee  Employee  TFPl 
Total 
1. Food & kindred 
2.  Chemicals & rubber 
3.  Drugs 
4.  Metals 
5.  Machinery 
6.  Electrical equipment 
7.  Transportation equipment 
8.  Instruments 































































-  .039 
(.043) 
-  ,029 
-  ,030 
-.017 


























































.08  1 
(.035) 
,017 
"Average employed, 1976 -  arithmetic average. 
bR/S 1973 (estimated) -  1972  through 1974  average R&D divided by average sales in 1972  and 1974. 
'Approximate TFP (total factor productivity) = growth in deflated sales per employee -  .25  (growth in plant per employee). 
dOECD  data-based  corrections raise this number to ,016 and ,009 for electrical and transportation equipment industries, respectively. For the total sample, however, 
this adjustment raises RIS to only ,011. Table 8.6  Continuous R&D-Reporting  Firms Subsample for the United States, 1973-80  Growth Rates (per year) and 1973 Levels: Means 
(and standard deviations) for Major Variables 
Industry 
Average Growth Rates 1973-80 
Employed,  Deflated  Adjusted Gross 
Average 
1976 in  RIS 1973  Sales per  Plant per  Approximate 
N  Thousandsa  (estimated)b  Employees  Employee  Employee  TW 
Total 
1. Food & kindred 




6. Electrical equipment 




















































































































-  ,005 
(.033) 












-  ,000 
(.026) 
"Average employed, 1976 -  arithmetic average. 
bRIS 1973 (estimated) -  1972 through 1974 average R&D divided by average sales in 1972 and 1974. 
'Approximate TFP (total factor productivity) = growth in deflated sales per employee -  .25 (growth in plant per employee). 198  Chapter8 
growth of the capital-labor ratio was very similar for the different industrial 
groupings, varying much less than the growth in the output-labor ratio. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the ratio of real wages to capital user costs 
moved differently between the two countries but essentially similarly for the 
different industries within these countries. 
If  one estimates total factor productivity growth by  assuming that value 
added and sales vary proportionately and that the capital input weight in value 
added is constant and equal to 0.25 for all firms in both countries, one finds 
several commonalities and  also some contrasts. In both countries the high 
R&D industries split in their productivity experience: electric equipment and 
instruments have  the highest productivity growth rates while chemicals are 
among the lowest ones. The major contrasts occur in the machinery, transporta- 
tion equipment, and drug industries, where there was significant productivity 
growth in Japan but not in the United States.I5  Only in the food industry did 
the United States do better than Japan as far as total factor productivity growth 
is concerned. 
Our numbers are not strictly comparable to similar macroestimates, both 
because they are unweighted firm averages and because many of the firms in 
our two samples are multinationals with neither their employment nor produc- 
tivity restricted entirely to the country of origin. Nevertheless, table 8.7 pres- 
ents the figures on average growth rates of labor and labor productivity that we 
have gathered at the industry level and for manufacturing as a whole in the two 
countries, and the corresponding measures from our two total samples.16  There 
is no striking inconsistency in the two sets of micro- and macroestimates, but 
rather a rough agreement in terms of  the pattern of  differences both across 
industries and countries. For example, productivity growth is clearly the high- 
est for electrical equipment in the two countries and about the lowest for met- 
als; it is also the case that transportation equipment did quite well in Japan 
contrary to the United States.17 It is interesting to note, however, that the overall 
growth in productivity tends to be more rapid for the firms in our samples than 
for manufacturing as a whole (the differential being as much as 1.7% per year 
in Japan and 0.8% in the United States), while the contrast in employment 
experience is even larger: 2.5% slower growth in our firm data in Japan versus 
the United States, as against only a 0.8% differential in the national-income- 
accounts-based industry totals. 
15. Using a more appropriate price deflator for the drug companies in Japan than one used for 
the chemical industry as a whole (which was done in an earlier version of the paper) results in a 
significant rise in their estimated productivity growth, but it has no effect on regression results that 
allow for separate industry constants. 
16. The macroestimates for Japan are taken from the Annual Reports on National Income Statis- 
tics. Those for the United States are constructed from output series based on the Survey of Manu- 
factures and from the price indices used in National Accounts-see  Griliches and Lichtenberg 
(1984) for details. Note that table 8.6 is based on total samples, not just the R&D firms. A compari- 
son of tables 8.5 and 8.6 with 8.7 shows only minor differences between our total sample and the 
R&D firms subsample. 
17. Our numbers are also consistent with the macroevidence given in Jorgenson, Kuroda, and 
Nishimizu (1987). Table 8.7  Average Growth Rates, 1973-80,  of Labor and Labor Productivity at Company and Industry Level 
Japan  United States 
Total Sample  National Accounts  Total Sample  National Accounts 
Deflated  Real  Deflated  Real 
Sales per  All  Output per  Sales per  All  Output per 
Industry  N  Employees  Employee  Persons  Person  N  Employees  Employee  Persons  Person 
Total 
1. Food 



























-  .03  1 
(.035) 
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-.016 
(.045) 
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-  .009b 
-  ,007 




















































-  ,008 
(.052) 











-  ,002 
.007 
,010 
-  ,005 
,023" 
.022 




-  .002 
,015 
-.013 
-  ,004" 
.05  1 
-  .009 
.ooo 
"Machinery and instruments. 
bChemicals & rubber, and drugs. 200  Chapter8 
8.4  R&D Intensity and Productivity Growth at the Firm Level 
The model we consider can be thought of as a modified version of the Cobb- 
Douglas production function in its growth rate form, with labor productivity 
being a function of the physical capital-labor  ratio and research capital.I8 Be- 
cause we have only a very short history of research expenditures for most of 
these firms, it is difficult to construct a reliable research capital measure. We 
use, therefore, the R&D intensity version of this model instead, in which the 
beginning period R&D to sales ratio is substituted for the unavailable R&D 
capital variable. 
Let the true equation be 
(9 - 1) =  A + CY(C -  I)  + yk + p,1 + U, 
where small lettered variables stand for rates of growth (logarithmic changes): 
q,  I, and c represent output, employment, and physical capital, respectively; k 
is  a measure of  accumulated research capital; a,  p,  y  are the elasticities 
of  output with respect to physical capital, labor, and research capital; p,  = 
(a  + p -  1) is the economies of scale coefficient; A is a constant that reflects, 
among other things, disembodied technical change; and u is a random distur- 
bance standing in for all other unspecified effects affecting measured produc- 
tivity growth. 
The research capital elasticity y is equal, by  definition, to (dQ/dK)(K/Q). 
Since k = dK/K,  we can simplify yk = (dQ/dK)(K/Q)(dK/K)  to p(R/Q),  where 
p = dQ/dK is the marginal product of research capital and R is the level of 
R&D expenditures. "ivo points need to be made about this type of simplifica- 
tion: it assumes that R, gross expenditures on R&D, is a good proxy for net 
investment (dK)  in R&D capital. This can be true only if there is no or little 
depreciation of research capital or if we are in the beginning phases of accumu- 
lation and the initial stocks of K are small. Also, it is assumed that p rather 
than y is constant across firms, that the rate of return p is the parameter that is 
more likely to be equalized across finns.19 
The equations that we estimate are then of the form 
(4 - 1) =  A + OI(C -  I) + p,1  + p(R/Q) + U, 
where the rates of growth of (q -  I), (c -  E),  are generally computed over the 
seven-year period 1973-80. 
18. A number of issues are ignored in such a framework, not because they are unimportant, but 
primarily because there is little that we can do about them here. For example, much of the Japanese 
progress may be based on imported technology, for which we have no data. However, to the extent 
that R&D expenditures are required to absorb borrowed or imported technology, this may still be 
captured, in part, by our measures. We can also do little about the role of government R&D support 
(there are no data on this at the firm  level in either data base) or spillovers in this context (see 
Griliches 1979 for a discussion of these and other caveats). 
19. See Griliches (1979) and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) for a related discussion of such 
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The adoption of this specification has two important consequences: first, the 
estimating equation is expressed in terms of  rates of  growth of productivity 
(first differences of the logarithms of the various variables) and thus does not 
relate differences in productivity levels to differences in R&D capital. This has 
the advantage of protecting the estimates from potential biases due to (corre- 
lated) specific effects but at the cost of ignoring the large variability of the data 
in the cross-sectional dimension. We  know from previous work that results 
based on this dimension (between-firms) are usually stronger than those based 
only on the time dimension (within-firms) (see, e.g., Griliches and Mairesse 
[1984] and Cuneo and Mairesse [1984]). A second consequence is that we 
relate differences in the rate of growth of productivity to differences in R&D 
to sales ratios (rather than to the differences in the rate of  growth of  R&D 
capital stock).zo 
Several alternative measures of R&D intensity, R/Q,  were tried with largely 
similar results. The final variable chosen, ARB,  relates the average amount of 
deflated R&D during 1972-74  to the mean (geometric) levels of deflated sales 
for the period as a whole (average of  1973 and 1980 sales). The numerator of 
this ratio refers to the beginning of  the period and allows, implicitly, for an 
approximate three-year lag in the effects of R~CD.~’  The denominator is posi- 
tioned in the middle of  the period to reduce the spuriousness that may arise 
when a growth rate is based on a ratio whose denominator is in fact the initial 
level from which the growth rate is measured.22  Instead of a unique trend term 
we include, usually, separate industry dummy variables, which allow for differ- 
ential industrial trends of disembodied technical change, and also for deflator 
errors and industrywide changes in capacity utilization. Such equations were 
also estimated separately for each industrial grouping. 
20. There are several difficulties in interpreting the estimated coefficient of R&D intensity, p. 
as the marginal product of or rate of return to R&D. The exact meaning of the estimated p depends 
on the measure of R&D intensity, the measure of output, and what else is included in the equation. 
Since we use an R&D to sales ratio, p should be interpreted as a gross marginal product in terms 
of output. But leaving material inputs out of the equation brings it closer to a value-added interpre- 
tation, which would presumably have resulted in a lower coefficient if value added were substituted 
for sales in the denominator. On the other hand, leaving out the “depreciation” of the existing 
R&D capital stock would bias the estimated coefficient downward (on the order of a half). It is 
also the case that the estimated p may be affected by the fact that R&D labor and R&D capital are 
counted twice, once in the available measures of labor and physical capital and again in the mea- 
sure of R&D. Hence p might be viewed as an excess marginal product or rate of return (above the 
usual remuneration). Such an interpretation must be qualified however, since it does not apply 
easily to estimates in the time dimension (see Griliches 1979; Schankerman 1981; Griliches and 
Lichtenberg 1984; and Cuneo and Mairesse 1984 on these matters). Thus the estimated p coeffi- 
cients are only very distant reflections of the relevant “rate of return” concept. 
21. We also tried shorter lags, i.e., by defining the R&D measure as of 1976 (the middle of our 
period) but this produced significantly worse results in both Japan and the United States. We could 
not really try for longer lags within the framework of our data bases. 
22. Using sales in 1973 or an average of  1972 and 1974 sales as a base does indeed make our 
results look significantly better. Using the RE73 (estimated) ratio (i.e., 2R73/[S72 + S741) in eq. 
5 of table 8.8,  for example, we get for its coefficient .36 with a r-ratio of 2.6 in Japan and .42 with 
a t-ratio of 5.5 in the United States. These are significantly higher than the comparable numbers 
in table 8.8. Since the R&D numerator is the same in both measures, this does imply that our 
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Table 8.8 summarizes our main econometric results. The estimated R&D 
coefficients in the productivity growth equations are of  similar magnitude in 
both countries. They fall substantially when industry dummies (trends) are al- 
lowed for, implying, possibly, the presence of significant interfirm R&D spill- 
overs. The major difference is that, in this case, the coefficients for Japan are 
not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. 
Although significant, the contribution of R&D intensity to the explanation 
of the variance in productivity growth across firms is rather small, the fit barely 
improving in the second decimal place. Nor can R&D account for the mean 
difference in growth rates between the two countries. Both the average R&D 
intensities and the estimated coefficients are quite close to each other. Never- 
theless, if these coefficients are taken at face value, they imply that R&D con- 
tributed between 0.4% and 0.6% per year to productivity growth in both coun- 
tries. This is not a small matter after all. 
What is most striking in our results is the lower estimated contribution of 
physical capital to output growth in the United States. It is about half of what 
is estimated for Japan.23  In fact, if we apply the coefficients in table 8.8 (regres- 
sion 3) to the first row of table 8.5, we can account for about half of the Japan- 
United States difference in productivity growth by (1) the twice-as-fast rate of 
growth of the capital-labor ratio in Japan, and (2)  its twice-as-large effect on 
productivity there. The reasons for both of  these findings remain to be eluci- 
dated. 
On the other hand, the Japanese data seem also to imply a much sharper rate 
of  diminishing returns. This last estimate (the -.24  coefficient in regression 
5) seems rather difficult to believe; it could be due to errors in the Japanese 
labor variable or to our inability to properly account for the problem of varying 
capacity utilization and hours of work. In any case, since the Japanese firms 
reduced their average employment during this period, such “diminishing re- 
turns” could not serve as a brake on their productivity growth. 
Table 8.9 summarizes our attempts to look at the same issues at the individ- 
ual industry level. Given the high error rates in the data at the firm level and 
the relatively small sample sizes, there is little to be seen here. Consistent with 
our earlier finding that the overall R&D coefficient was not statistically sig- 
nificant in Japan, the individual industry estimates are found to be about half 
positive and half negative, and only three of them have both the right sign and 
exceed their estimated standard error. For the United States, the results are only 
slightly better: seven out of the nine industries have positive R&D coefficients, 
and three of them are larger than their estimated standard errors. There is little 
relationship, moreover, in the relative size of these coefficients across the same 
industry groupings in the two countries (see lower panel of table 8.9). 
We  made several efforts to improve matters by  redefining variables and 
23. The higher capital elasticity estimate in Japan is consistent with the higher capital share in 
output reported by Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987). Table 8.8  Productivity (deflated sales per employee) Growth in Manufacturing at the Firm Level as a Function of Growth in the Capital- 
Labor Ratio and R&D Intensity: Japan-United  States Comparisons, 1973-80 
Coefficients and (Standard Errors)  R2  and (MSE) 
Japan  United States 
United 















,562  .146 
(.229)  (.032) 
,152 
(.030) 
,302  ,155 
(.214)  (.029) 
,240  ,203  ,107 
(.049)  (.209)  (.033) 
.072 
(.00  198) 
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(.093)  (.00  196) 
,500 
(.00111) 
,267  SO2 
(.096)  (.00110) 
-  ,080  ,248  .531 
(.026)  (.096)  (.00104) 
.03  1 
(.00  14  1) 
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Note: Equations 3-5  contain an additional 13 industry dummy variables. Regression 5 includes also the average 1972-74  employment level as a control variable for 
initial size. Its coefficient is small, positive, and significant for the United States and essentially zero for Japan. MSE is the mean square error of regression residuals. 
=C/Z = growth rate of gross plant in constant prices per employee. 
bL = growth rate of employment. 
'AWS = average R&D to sales ratio. R&D averaged for the years 1972-74,  sales at mid-point of the period: geometric average of beginning- (1973) and end-period 
(1980) sales. Both variables are deflated. 204  Chapter8 
Table 8.9  Distribution of the RIS Coefficients by Industry (regression  4) 









<O  0-.5  >.5  Total 
3  2  5 
1  3  4 
4  2  3  9 
1  3  1  5 
1  1  2  4 
2  4  3  9 
Coefficients for Japan 
Coefficients for the United States:  <O  0-.5  >.5  Total 
<O  1  1  2 
0-.5  1  1  2  4 
>  .5  2  1  3 
Total  4  2  3  9 
changing the time periods somewhat, but this had little effect. The results are 
quite robust to the use of net rather than gross physical capital measures or to 
changes in the averaging procedures for the R&D data. Changing time periods, 
however, makes more of a difference. Using the slightly shorter 1974-79  pe- 
riod improves the estimates somewhat in Japan but deteriorates them in the 
United States.24  This leads us to a disappointing finding: the instability of the 
productivity-R&D  relationship  and its sensitivity to the business  cycle and 
macroeconomic supply shocks. 
Table 8.10 presents annual estimates of the R&D coefficients using approxi- 
mate total factor production (TFP) growth as the dependent variable. We use 
TFP here to avoid adding another source of variation, which would come from 
allowing also the physical capital elasticity to vary from year to year.25  What is 
striking is that, though the exact timing was a bit different,  the oil shock- 
induced sharp recession of  1974-75  hit the R&D-intensive firms dispropor- 
tionately hard in both countries. It is not clear, however, whether what we see 
in this table represents a real phenomenon or is just another reflection of the 
thinness of our data and our inability to estimate the effects of R&D precisely.26 
24. About half the inflation during our seven-year study period of  1973-80  took place in the 
first year, 1973-74,  and in the last one, 1979-80,  as a consequence of  the two oil shocks of  1973 
and 1979. We  thought that the potential errors in price deflators and hence in our productivity 
measures would thus be smaller for the shorter period 1974-79  and hoped for better results over 
this period. 
25. The estimated physical capital elasticity also varies from year to year. But since the growth 
in the capital-labor ratio and R&D intensity are nearly uncorrelated, the R&D coefficients are 
almost unaffected by the constraining of the capital coefficient implicit in the TFP equations. 
26. Using average rates of growth over a number of years to estimate the relation of productivity 
to R&D has the advantage of minimizing the possible biases due to measurement errors and to the 205  Comparing Japanese and U.S.  Manufacturing Firms 
Table 8.10  Coefficients of R&D Intensity in TFP Growth Regressions, by Year, 
Japan and the United States, 1974-80 
United 
Year  Japan  States 
1973-74  -  .73 
1974-75  -  .73 
1975-76  .5 1 
(31) 
1976-77  .85 
1977-78  1.01 
(.67) 
1978-79  .m 
(.W 





Note: Approximate TFP growth is calculated as: (percent growth in deflated sales per employee) 
-  .25(percent growth in gross plant per employee). All equations contain an additional set of 
industry dummies and a base year (1973) size variable. The R&D-intensity variable, ARB, is cal- 
culated as the average of  1972-74  R&D divided by the average (geometric) 1973 and 1980 sales 
(both deflated). It is the same for all years. 
8.5  Tentative Conclusions 
Japanese manufacturing firms spent about as much of their own money on 
R&D, relative to their sales, as did similar U.S.  firms: about 1.9% versus 2.3%, 
respectively, in 1976. On the basis of the econometric analysis of our sample 
of  R&D firms, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the contribution of these 
expenditures to productivity growth was about the same in both countries. 
There is no strong prima facie evidence for the hypothesis that differences in 
either the intensity or the fecundity of R&D expenditures can account for the 
rather large difference in the observed rates of growth of productivity between 
the two countries.27  The reasons for this difference must be looked for else- 
where. 
We  do find two important differences between Japan and the United States 
that help to account for some of this difference but require an explanation of 
their own: 
1. In spite of their success in growing and exporting, Japanese firms reduced 
their employment levels significantly during this period while U.S. firms were 
increasing theirs. This alone is enough to account for the twice-faster growth 
timing problem. We expected, therefore, to find instability when looking at this relation on a single 
year basis, but not to such an extent. 
27. Given the high standard errors associated with the Japanese estimates, it is not strong evi- 
dence against this hypothesis either. 206  Chapter8 
in the capital-labor ratio in Japanese manufacturing since the capital stock it- 
self has been growing at roughly similar rates in both countries. 
2. For reasons that are not well understood, the estimated effect of growth 
in the capital-labor ratio on firm productivity in manufacturing appears to be 
twice as large in Japan as in the United States. An exploration of the reasons 
for this difference awaits better data, another occasion, and perhaps a different 
approach to the problem. 
There are a number of  other puzzling findings that we hope to return to in 
the future: Why did the chemical industry perform so badly during this period 
in both countries? Why did the drug industry do so badly in the United States 
during these same years? Is this a real fact or an artifact of poor deflators? 
While the oil price shocks provide some explanation for the poor performance 
of the chemical firms along lines outlined by  Bruno and Sachs (1985), it is 
doubtful that they can also explain the experience of the pharmaceutical firms 
in the United States. Why does the effect of  R&D intensity on productivity 
growth vary so much over the cycle? Is it because it should only be observable 
at or near full capacity? How can such considerations be incorporated into a 
more complete analysis of our data? 
An  improved analysis of  the role of  R&D expenditures in the growth of 
Japanese firms will require better data than are currently available to us. The 
Japanese Statistics Bureau has collected much more extensive and presumably 
more reliable data on R&D expenditures of firms for many years but as far as 
we know these data have not been accessible, nor have they been used in their 
detailed micro form. In the United States, similarly collected data by the Na- 
tional Science Foundation (NSF) and the Bureau of  the Census have been 
matched for different surveys and brought together in a usable data file. The 
confidentiality problem was solved by performing all of the major data assem- 
bly and cleaning operations within the Census Bureau and by releasing only 
variance-covariance matrices for the major variables across firms and years 
without disclosing any individual firm information.28  It would certainly be in- 
teresting to launch a similar effort in Japan. Another way  of dealing with the 
confidentiality requirement is to carry out the econometric analysis within the 
National Statistical Offices themselves, as was the case for our studies for 
France.29 
We  cannot expect, however, that having better and more reliable data will 
solve all the problems. What we  are looking for are effects that are at best 
variable, uncertain, and more or less long term in nature and that are also rela- 
tively small in magnitude. This does not mean, of course, that these effects are 
unimportant or that we should not devote more effort in trying to analyze them. 
But we cannot expect to account for much of the observed growth in productiv- 
28. See Griliches (1980, 1986) and Griliches and Hall (1982) for more detail on these data and 
their construction and for results of analyses using them. 
29. Since this was first written we have been informed that such efforts are indeed underway by 
researchers associated with the Economic Planning Agency in Japan. See Goto and Suzuki (1989). 207  Comparing Japanese and U.S. Manufacturing Firms 
ity by focusing only on the firm’s own R&D investments. The role of research 
spillovers between firms, sectors, and countries and the impact of other, less 
formal, ways of generating technical progress, are likely to be quite large and 
still remain to be measured. 
Addendum 
After the revision and completion of this paper for this volume, we gained 
access to new R&D information at the firm level for Japan. We  are grateful to 
Fumio Hayashi for his help in getting these data. 
Besides the R&D figures reported in the NEEDS data base and the official 
R&D survey of the Statistics Bureau of Japan, there exists in fact another R&D 
survey performed and published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Corporation in 
recent years. This survey is the source of  the OECD numbers, which we al- 
ready used to adjust the NEEDS figures for 18 of the largest R&D firms. In 
order to check our numbers on a larger scale, we matched these new data to 
our total sample of  1,032 firms for the fiscal year  1978 or  1979. We  found 
1,000 firms in common, among which 877 were reporting R&D expenditures. 
These 877 include our sample of  406 firms that reported R&D consistently 
from 1972 through 1980 in NEEDS and 471 firms that did not. When we com- 
pare the R&D numbers in the two sources for our 406 firms sample, the dis- 
crepancy is less than 5% for more than half of the sample; it is less than 50% 
for another quarter, but it is more than 400% for 48 firms. Contrary to the 18 
large R&D adjusted firms, these 48 firms are smaller than average, and it is 
quite plausible that a major part of their R&D expenditures is external or coop- 
erative and is not declared in NEEDS. 
We  have adjusted our R&D-intensity variable using the new R&D informa- 
tion (as we already had done with the OECD figures), and we have rerun our 
main regressions using these adjusted measures for various subsamples: the 
406 R&D-reporting firms, among which we consider the 48 R&D-reporting 
firms with very  large R&D discrepancies separately, and the remaining 358 
R&D-reporting firms. We have also used the new R&D data for the 471 firms 
that did not report, or reported intermittently, R&D expenditures in NEEDS. 
Pooling together this sample and the previous ones, we have two overall sam- 
ples of 877 (406 + 471) and 829 (358 + 471) firms. The results for the sim- 
plest regression (with constant returns to scale and without industry dummies, 
comparable to regression 2 in table 8.7) are given in table 8A.  1. 
Using the adjusted R&D-intensity variable does not really improve our esti- 
mates. They remain about the same if the 48 firms for which the discrepancies 
are extreme are excluded, and they look worse if we do include them, the coef- 
ficient of  R&D being smaller and not significant. Clearly one would like to 
know more about the 48 problematic firms. The estimates for the additional 
471 firms sample and for the pooled 829 firms sample are also very similar to 
our previous results. 208  Chapter8 
Table 8A.1  Productivity Growth-R&D Intensity Regressions with and without 
R&D Adjusted Measures for Various Samples of Japanese Firms: 
1973-80 (similar to regression 2 in table 8.8) 
R&D Measures from  R&D Adjusted Measures, 
NEEDS, Coefficients and  Coefficients and 
Standard Errors  Standard Errors 
R2  R2 
Various Samples  C/L  AWS  MSE  C/L  AWS  MSE 
406 R&D-reporting firms 
48 R&D-reporting firms 
with very large R&D 
discrepancies 
358 R&D-reporting firms 
without very large 
R&D discrepancies 










without firms with 
very large R&D 
discrepancies 
(358 + 471) 
.38  .56  ,085 
(.07)  (.23)  .0020 
.oo  5.22  ,090 
(.20)  (2.53)  ,0010 
.42  .48  ,101 















On the whole these computations confirm our earlier results. This is reassur- 
ing since R&D expenditures are poorly reported in the NEEDS data bank. But 
it is also unfortunate since one would have hoped for somewhat stronger and 
more significant estimates with better and more accurate figures. Again the 
quality of the data is not our only problem. 
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